social solidarity—the institutional embodiment of the so-called ‘Dunkirk spirit’—would continue indefinitely into the era of peace.

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4

Beveridge in the Longue Durée

PETER BALDWIN

I come neither to bury Beveridge nor to honour him, although the temptation to strive for one or the other of these two extremes is great at the half-century mark after his most lasting achievement. Any retrospective evaluation not wholly in thrall either to ritual encomium or denunciation is likely to hover ambiguously between honouring and burying. Examining Beveridge and his influence in the comparatively longue durée we have put behind us since the publication of Social Insurance and Allied Services is no exception. The longue durée is a concept usually attributed to the French historian Fernand Braudel. It marks an attempt to situate historical events in their broadest possible context, in a flow of time that is almost geological in its imperceptible movement. Such an analysis has the advantage of allowing the historian to separate out the important from the trivial, the durable from the ephemeral. But at the same time, of course, when regarded from such Olympian heights, all mortalis are but dust. If we combine one of Keynes's better known maxims with Braudel's historical philosophy, we may quickly agree that in the longue durée we are all dead—Beveridge as much as lesser mortals. Any retrospective must fairly balance two rival historical claims. On the one hand is Beveridge's tremendous reputation at the end of the Second World War as the father of modern British social policy and as one of the main international architects of what has been called the social citizenship model of the welfare state. On the other are the factors that lessen the otherwise extraordinary prominence of his place in social policy history. These include the length to which some of the principles often associated with his name had in fact been implemented already, earlier, in other nations, the extent to which the planks of his platform have subsequently been abandoned in British social policy, and the degree to which his influence abroad has been less than it seemed in the first flush of the Report's publication.

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THE BEVERIDGE MYTHOLOGY

Let us begin with the aura. The nebula of charismatic authority surrounding his reputation sets Beveridge apart from all other social politicians. His name, even today, evokes metaphors of founding fatherhood of the welfare state and a reverence for the possibilities of statutory benevolence that has otherwise been lost in the nasty battles following the cutbacks of the 1970s. Old age pensioners may have thanked ‘that Lord George’ when they began receiving benefits after 1908, but Lloyd George’s historical reputation obviously rests more firmly on his other accomplishments. Bismarck is perhaps the only other figure in the development of the welfare state with a reputation equal to Beveridge’s, but his place in history also rests only marginally on social policy endeavours and then not in a very positive sense. The Beveridge Report has become a benchmark in the annals of social policy history, although, like Masters and Johnson in its year of publication, it was probably the most-sold, least-perused book of 1942. Beveridge’s only rival among state papers, in public impact if not ignominious detail, was the Denning Report on the Profumo scandal (Kinchard 1973: 45).

To sense this aura surrounding the Report and its author, all one need do is to compare Social Insurance and Allied Services to the other wartime blueprints for welfare reform: Marsh, Wagner, van Acker, van Rhijn, Parodi, D’Aragon. Where are they now? These were all social politicians with a local reputation and a plan for change to their name, but none of that transcendence evoked by Beveridge.

The heightened fervour of the wartime years certainly contributed to Beveridge’s appeal. James Griffiths described the Report as munia falling from heaven, and that was in the sober retrospection of his memoirs a quarter-century later (Griffiths 1969: 70). The hyperbole at the time was, if possible, even greater. Even the enemy took notice, with the Nazis piqued that, by promising the state’s concern for the material wellbeing of its citizens, Beveridge had appropriated what they regarded as one of the propaganda feathers in their cap. That the Report was published just after victory at El Alamein, seen even then as a turning point, and thus coincided with a hopeful sea change in the public mood at the War’s prospects was a fortuitous coincidence. At a moment of blood, sweat, and tears rhetoric, the stuff of the Report may not appear to have been the kind of subject to send adrenalin coursing through the collective veins, but in fact Beveridge had managed to hook his concern with the nuts and bolts of social policy to more elevated and inspiring themes. The Atlantic Charter of the previous year had held out social security as one of the postwar era’s ambitions. Beveridge fleshed out such lofty promises, providing the details of what was expected by many to be a new order. Rhetorically, Beveridge was adept at emphasizing the broader social themes embodied in his particular suggestions. His was not the average Command Paper; it was part legislative proposal, part visionary philosophy.

To such specific considerations comes a more general way in which the wartime circumstances of the Report’s publication added to the jubilation of its popular reception. Several scholars, especially Richard Titmuss and Arthur Mapwick, have made their reputations suggesting and elaborating the idea that the War encouraged a general sentiment of social solidarity. The events of the hostilities, especially the bombings, nourished the perception that all citizens shared many risks in common, and fostered a heightened sense of community. The War, so the argument runs, allowed a solidaristic conceptual breakthrough, a partial renegotiation of the social contract. All citizens, even those who had formerly thought they were capable of managing without the state’s aid, now found themselves facing the same major risks on a largely similar footing. All were in the same boat. Rawls’s veil of ignorance descended for a short but significant time on British society and citizens who now approached their fate with apparently similar chances were persuaded that solidarity was the social virtue to characterize postwar reforms. All citizens were to be treated equally, not just in the formal terms of civil and political rights, but also in the more bread-and-butter measure of an equal claim to basic subsistence. Seen in this broader context of common threats to all, charity became mutual self-help based on individual self-interest.

Finally we have what is an historiographical reason for Beveridge’s reputation: the gloss put on the Report by T. H. Marshall. In a sense, Beveridge found his historian already during his lifetime, indeed at the peak of his influence. Their relationship was not that of Johnson with his Boswell, providing posterity with intimate details that would otherwise have got lost, but rather more like Robespierre with his Marx. In his renowned Cambridge lectures in 1949, just a year after the main reforms of the Labour Government, Marshall elaborated a powerful, plausible, world historical perspective by which to judge the measures that Beveridge had been so instrumental in prompting. Marshall’s grand teleology of an historical progression through a trinity of modes of citizenship, from civil, to political, and finally to social rights, portrayed the Beveridge/Labour reforms as the culmination of a centuries-long process, and imbued them with a transcendent importance that carried them, in terms of their role in history, far beyond what a framework of social policy legislation would otherwise have inspired. Marshall’s account of these postwar reforms as marking a significant change not just in the provision of social benefits, but in the very nature of the social contract, has guided the hand of textbook writers and general commentators ever since; it has set the tone for an interpretation of the welfare state that has proven enormously influential down to the present day.
What Marshall and this school of thought did was to make of the social citizenship welfare state, as embodied in the Beveridge/Labour reforms, the historical answer in Western European history to the Russian Revolution and the birth of socialism in the east. Marshall provided a reformist, social-democratic alternative to the Marxist reading of modern European history. In the Marxist historical analysis, feudalism had given way to capitalism and the reign of the middle classes during the revolution in 1789. The next step was to be another shift in power between rising and declining classes, as the proletariat took the reins from the bourgeoisie, installing itself in power and allegedly abolishing the whole process of class antagonism. The nations of Western Europe waited in vain, however, for this subsequent progression. Instead, what some of them got, in Marshall’s account, was a shift to the social citizenship welfare state. This may not have been the revolution expected on the far left, but at the same time it represented something more than just a reformist adjustment to the ruling order. The social citizenship welfare state capped the evolution of civil and political rights with their meat-and-potatoes equivalents. Material well-being even in times of personal misfortune, something that had not yet been included in the definition of citizenship, an element that had been left to the market place for adjudication, now became part of what it was to be a member of the community. Equality was not to mean just the right of all, rich and poor, to personal freedoms, the vote and the privilege of sleeping under bridges, but to a certain modicum of well being, a basic civilized level of income.

The fact that the apparently main historical route through the socialist revolution, to which the social citizenship welfare state provided an alternative, has collapsed in the meantime certainly does not detract from the allure of the Marshallian reading of Western European developments. The point worth underlining here in this well known story is the extent to which the Beveridge/Labour legislation was lucky enough to find its world historical interpreter just as it came to fruition. Marshall made dramatic, but plausible and well argued claims for the reforms. He made of them, in effect, an historical event equivalent in importance and stature to the French or Russian Revolutions, and that was no mean feat for what was basically a series of laws on social insurance.

**BEVERIDGE’S BALANCING ACT**

And yet, the wartime aura is not enough to explain Beveridge’s elevation to whatever pantheon social policy possesses. Many things seemed important in the heightened atmosphere of wartime and the years immediately following and none the less vanished once the humdrum everydayness of postwar life set in again. The belief that the Resistance could be the basis of a political renewal for France is perhaps the most sobering example. Moreover, it is clear that the wartime spirit of social solidarity can only partially explain the popular resonance of the Report. Many countries, after all, had been at war, their citizens subject to the same mortal risks, but not all nations emerged apparently prepared to legislate on the basis of an expansive sense of inclusive community. There were obviously qualities to what Beveridge proposed and what Labour sought to implement that had an appeal of their own, regardless of the immediately surrounding circumstances.

What made the Beveridge Report and the reforms associated with it remarkable was the manner in which they balanced on a knife edge both the collectivism and the individualism inherent in any social policy. Beveridge formulated an ideology of collectivist social insurance, and thus advocated the full realization of the reconciliation between community and society that insurance makes possible. One of the main themes of François Ewald’s brilliant book, which deals with the welfare state in its broadest sense, is the extent to which insurance—and especially social insurance, with its broadening of the risks and groups covered—perfectly embodied the reforming liberal’s hope of harmonizing the need for the community’s solicitude and intervention with the individual’s autonomy and insistence on personal freedom (Ewald 1986). Ewald manages to accomplish the unlikely task of turning the invention of the actuarial table and its ability to map the regularities of misfortune and mortality that lie beneath the flux of individual fates into an historically path-breaking step in the evolution of modern society. Given an ability to predict the usual occurrence of various forms of mischance, society could, with minimal compulsion and regulation, now help individuals by ensuring that they never need suffer more than the cost of an average burden. Insurance promised individuals that they would have to endure no fate greater than the average, at least to the extent that misfortune could be pecuniarily compensated for, and social insurance guaranteed that the bulk of society enjoyed the benefits of such risk equalization.

Two extremes of possible human social experience were in this way avoided: on the one hand, the medieval view of society as something like a family writ large, hierarchical, paternalistic, communal; on the other, the extreme liberalist view of society as a mere conglomeration of autonomous, individualistic monads, brought together only incidentally in their pursuit of self interest. With the redistribution of the costs of risk allowed by the science of probability, actuarial mathematics, and the development of insurance techniques, a middle ground was staked out between these extremes that embodies what Ewald sees as the essence of the modern social contract. The individual was allowed personal freedom and autonomy and
yet did not have to forgo the advantages of communal solidarity, the help of the group in times of need. Society became seen as the largest possible risk pool, and the citizen as a policy holder. Quetelet, the Belgian astronomer and mathematician who popularized the use of averages and means in the taming of social problems, was thus canonized as the patron saint of modern society in this liberal reforming vision that Ewald traces as the philosophical core insight behind the welfare state. Quetelet elevated the average human, l'homme type, a statistical abstraction which was now treated as a social reality, as the common benchmark against which the deviations of life outside the actuary's tables were measured (Hacking 1990: 105–14). It was not classes struggling with each other nor a mutual advantage that primarily characterized modern society, but rather the equalization of each individual's risks with the group—a fundamental base of equity, in other words, that permitted the inequalities of the market free rein in other realms.

Much of this will seem commonplace to those familiar with such subjects. But it is worth reminding ourselves of the potentially solidaristic impulse behind social insurance, especially given the generation or so of interpretations that has emphasized the extent to which certain varieties of social insurance can be applied to much less enlightened or liberating goals. Most obviously, the Bonapartist ambitions pursued by Bismarck with his welfare legislation are hard to fit into an Ewaldian conception of social solidarity. Given this background, it is one of the major reasons for the positive response to Beveridge that he was able to capture or recapture the solidaristic element of social insurance underlined by Ewald. Social insurance before Beveridge had not fulfilled its solidaristic potential. On the Continent, where the technique had first and foremost come to fruition, social insurance was still organized in a corporatist manner during the interwar years. It had started out in the late nineteenth century largely limited to the manual working class. From here, it had expanded by degrees, sometimes taking into the system groups on the margins of the industrial proletariat, as with agricultural workers. Sometimes it had created new systems for new groups, as in Germany when salaried employees were insured apart from the manual workers with whom they did not wish to share an actuarial fate. Social insurance remained balkanized; it had managed to achieve only partial solidarities, to spread risks only within groups that were socio-economically quite homogeneous.

More importantly, large segments of society, in some cases a majority, were not yet regarded as needing this sort of communal solicitude. It was assumed that they were capable as individuals of coping with whatever misfortunes came their way. They were independent, both as a sociological classification and as indicative of their lack of participation in any risk pool. Large parts of society, especially among those who were not wage earners and who still made up half or so of the economically-active population in most Continental societies, did not belong to anything but the most rudimentary forms of private insurance. Because of such exemptions, the presumption remained that social policy was a concern only for the dependently employed, and especially workers; that it was something that solid citizens, the good burghers, did not need and would seek to avoid. Social insurance in its pre-Beveridgean incarnation was thus not a matter of interest to the citizen, but to the economic producer as a member of particular classes or economic groups.

This attitude is what Beveridge helped change. His clarion call was for a universal approach to social insurance, his aim to expand the risk pool from being limited to particular classes to embracing all citizens, his hope to make the redistribution of risk a reflection not of the needs of isolated groups, but of all mortality, of the whole community. This universal embrace that was now to characterize an enlightened application of social insurance lay at the heart of the concept of social citizenship as elaborated by Marshall. Just as personal liberties and then political expression had gone from being the preserve of some to the right of all, so, too, social rights were to be expanded. Not only the fortunate and prosperous were now to enjoy necessary medical care, a working life of uninterrupted income, or a dotage of comparative comfort. A minimum level of material well-being, basic protection against the vicissitudes of mortality and the inequities of the market, was now, like the vote, to be every citizen's birthright.

Because all citizens were to belong to the social policy system, the stigma that had earlier been attached to receiving support from the state, to being unable to maintain oneself without outside assistance, would be dissolved. The War had shown that all were in the same boat when it came to the basic risks of life and death. Universalist social insurance continued and extended this wartime insight to the everyday risks of postwar existence. Because all members of the community were now recognized as being equivalently dependent on the state's aid, the stigma of help from the community that had formerly affected only those who were not autonomous was to be erased by enrolling all citizens in the risk pool, making all equally reliant on society. The universalization of risk-sharing that was the hallmark of Beveridge's reforms removed the stigma of dependence through what might be called the Struwwelpeter approach. In Struwwelpeter, Heinrich Hoffmann's collection of admonitory children's stories, a group of white boys who make fun of a black are dipped into an inkwell, turning them as dark as the object of their ridicule. When even the millionaire queued at the post office for his pension, the less well endowed would feel no shame in collecting theirs. That was the logic of the universalization of dependence that enrolling all in the social insurance scheme entailed.

Each citizen was to belong to social insurance and contribute for the
risks that afflicted them. Not all were, of course, treated in precisely the same manner: housewives were not expected to insure against unemployment, although civil servants, who also suffered little from this risk, were. But all were to belong and no one was measured by his or her particular risk-proneness; each contributed according to the average risk and received according to their needs. Beveridge in this way heralded the fulfillment of the solidaristic potential of social insurance. The quarantining of certain groups within their own risk pools, the excusing of the wealthy and fortunate from sharing burdens with the harder pressed; these characteristics of the old style of social insurance were now to be superseded.

It was this universalist ambition that became the hallmark of the Beveridge reforms and that anchored his reputation in other nations. An all-inclusive embrace for social insurance was one of the most important characteristics of the social policy legislation proposed in France immediately after the war by Parodi, Croizat and Larroque. French reformers disagreed with Beveridge on plenty of other points, but they regarded the inclusion of the entire population as the surest way to achieve national solidarity. In Germany, one of the main debating points between the Christian and the Social Democrats turned precisely on this question of making social insurance a concern for all citizens. The right wished to retain the old system of socially-divided arrangements, while the left sought all inclusive and universalist reforms on the Beveridgean model. Neither set of reforms on the Continent achieved their ambitions at the time, and it was not until two decades later and then under very different circumstances that measures which captured some of this solidaristic wartime spirit were implemented here (Baldwin 1990, chs. 3, 5).

Beveridge did not, of course, single-handedly invent this universalist version of social insurance. Other nations had already implemented various measures adumbrating the social citizenship approach. Australia and New Zealand had introduced all-inclusive measures in the interwar years and had, partially as a consequence, attracted the attention of European, especially French, socialists as a model to follow. England’s own 1908 pension scheme was not limited to any particular social class. Much of such legislation, however, resembled old-fashioned poor relief more than it did social insurance. Benefits were often conditional on criteria of worth and worthiness, and thus universal only in the sense that they were the right of all respectable poor, regardless of what class or social group they might originally have been born into. The closest precursor to Beveridge’s proposals were therefore the Swedish pensions of 1913, the first example of ‘people’s pensions’ that, in return for contributions, gave all citizens a modest benefit regardless of class or income. Even reforms like the Swedish were, however, partial measures, limited to one form of social protection or another. Beveridge’s aim, and the reason for his enduring reputation, was more ambitious. He advocated something not yet attempted before: not just a universal embrace for one branch of social policy or another, but a comprehensive, complete system of social insurance in which all citizens found their place. It was the totalizing ambition of his Report that made its proposals so striking: the complete coverage against all risks for all people. All for one and one for all. The Three Musketeers meet the Government Actuary.

THE LIBERAL VISION

The universalist aspect of his proposals was, however, only half of Beveridge’s philosophy of social policy: the other half takes us away from the collectivist, solidaristic vision and towards the liberal bent of his ideology. The most important means by which Beveridge infused an otherwise solidaristic approach to welfare with a bedrock assumption of individualism and liberalism came with his emphasis on the insurance and contributory aspects of reforms. One way he hoped to eradicate the inherited stigma of dependence on statutory help was to enrol all citizens, and thus make all equally dependent, taking the Struwelpeter approach. The other arrow in Beveridge’s quiver was to make universal not just membership, but also the contractual legitimacy of benefits that a contributory approach allowed. All citizens were to become recipients, but at the same time all were to become contributors to the social insurance system. By universalizing social insurance all citizens, even those who had formerly been self reliant, were now made dependent on the state. By upholding the contributory, insurance side of provision, in contrast, the vast majority of recipients, even those who had formerly been regarded as incapable of contributing to their own upkeep, were now expected to become upright, self-maintaining citizens. Beveridge’s two-pronged approach to legitimizing the welfare state at one and the same time made the rich dependent and the poor respectable contributors.

Contributory social insurance had, in theory, no great advantage over tax financing; in and of itself it freed up no new resources to fund social policy and, from an Olympian vantage point, whether financing was assured through taxes or earmarked contributions was a bookkeeping distinction, or at best a question of which method seemed politically most astute. The advantage of a contributory system was psychological and thereby political. In an economic system otherwise saturated by market principles, the legitimacy of benefits that appeared to be paid for by their recipients’ contributions was much like that of any other commercial transaction. Being the purchaser and not just the consumer, the recipient claimed a right to benefits through ownership, thus needing to make no apologies for their
collection. Beveridge’s concept of citizenship made benefits contingent on contributions, but at the same time, it expected almost everyone to be a contributor. The Beveridgean welfare state was based on a nation of contributors, an underwriter’s paradise.

By taking the contributory tack, Beveridge helped set the course of future welfare policy also for nations other than Britain. British social politicians had been converted, after the dead end of the 1908 pensions, to a contributory approach following Lloyd George’s famous pilgrimage to Germany that summer. None the less, it still remained a debating point, one that largely separated the left from the centre and right; whether welfare policy should be financed out of general taxes or through earmarked contributions. The Webbs, in their minority report for the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws in 1909, had opposed a contributory approach because they believed that workers could not afford it. Three decades later, Beveridge was convinced they could. On the Continent, a heavily tax-financed system was never realistically on the agenda—in Germany because of long contributory traditions, in France because the precarious fiscal system could not have handled it. Even in Sweden, where disputes similar to the British were fought out, a heavily tax-financed approach was progressively abandoned starting in the 1930s in favour of much greater reliance on contributions (Rodriguez 1982).

To the extent that social insurance was erected on an orthodox actuarial basis and that contributions paid for at least a significant fraction of benefits, the stigma of dependence was sidestepped. It was avoided, however, not because a new attitude which accepted that all were ultimately dependent on the community’s aid had come to permeate society, but quite the contrary, because the old virtues of individual self-reliance and independence were now made the hallmark even of statutory provision against risk. The more heavily the contributory principle was emphasized, the more social insurance was made to seem like private insurance, the more the state became just another, although larger, insurance broker. Beveridge’s concern with eradicating means tests was indicative of this fundamentally contractual philosophy. The stigma of means tests demonstrated the extent to which, in a market system, benefits received without preconditions other than need were regarded as socially disabling. The distaste associated with means tests, and the insistence on a contributory and partially contractual basis for benefits, revealed a political and psychological resistance among most Britons to the logical consequences of social rights, the receipt of aid solely on the basis of citizenship and need.

Contributory social insurance by its nature considers most of its members to be capable of self-help, and limits the state’s role to organizing such bootstrap measures. It thus presupposes a fundamental homogeneity in its client population in at least two senses. First, it assumes that the risk pool is wealthy enough to eradicate poverty among some members by distributing income from others. Beveridge claimed in the Report that poverty was a problem of distribution, no longer of production. Workers as a group now had sufficient income that no-one need live in poverty if only resources were properly allocated. Second, a system of contributory social insurance assumes that the members of society’s actuarial risk pool are generally fully-employed income recipients who may suffer occasional or, in the case of old age, foreseeable interruptions of normal revenues, but who are otherwise in a position to be full contributing members of the insurance system, not just in terms of their income, but also in those of their mode of life. Social insurance is not so much designed to redistribute income vertically between social groups as horizontally across gaps in income receipt over the course of the individual’s lifetime. In his 1924 pamphlet, Insurance for All and Everything, and in the Report, Beveridge emphasized the concept of ‘interruption of earning’ as the factor that linked together all the different contingencies that insurance could relieve. His scheme was designed for ‘perfectly normal persons’ facing ‘disorders endemic in modern society,’ and took little account of the deviant, the incurable, and the down and out (Harris 1977: 350). Unlike charity or poor relief, social insurance, in Beveridge’s view, was geared to the needs of the majority, not to an atypical minority; the focus was not on the margins of society, but the mean.

Beveridge’s reliance on the insurance principle was part of his strategy for turning social policy from a form of state charity accompanied by the stigma of dependence into a right of citizenship, earned by the contributor. By insisting that everyone, even those who had formerly been considered incapable of thus participating, become contributors and thus earn the complete rights of social citizenship, Beveridge expanded the circle of full members of the community at the same time that he enlarged the nature of citizenship. Simultaneously, however, as a consequence of this approach, he drew the boundaries around full citizenship in a more exclusionary manner. Non-contributory, means-tested and therefore stigmatizing benefits had been received by a larger part of the population before the War than Beveridge intended would be the case after his reforms. Means-tested benefits were to be limited to an irreducible minimum, given only to the residual element of those who could not function in a contributory system. The rest of the population was assumed to share the characteristics of contributory citizenship. The insurance principle thus presupposes a fundamental degree of homogeneity within its target population, and it was on this homogeneity that the concept of social citizenship was founded: the citizen as contributory participant.

This basic assumption of the Beveridgean social citizenship welfare state has left its operating premises open to at least two sorts of criticism. First has been a new variant on the inherited social control critique. The old
version was a political attack on social policies' ability to smother impulses that might otherwise lead to radical reform. Welfare measures were mere amelioratives, Band Aids on festering sores, that took the edge off the worst misery, but in so doing prevented concerted efforts to root out the fundamental causes of social inequity. The new version, which relies heavily on Foucault's theories of social discipline, is a more culturally-oriented criticism. It accuses the welfare state of imposing norms, of being a method by which the average middle-class virtues are turned into benchmarks for the conduct of all groups and classes. It attacks, in other words, the presumption that all citizens must share the characteristics of contributory participation in order to enjoy the status of social citizenship.

Some of this criticism, when it is levelled against Beveridge, amounts to little more than an attack on him for being the child of his time, for not being able to transcend the prejudices of his period and station—an accusation to which, in the longue durée, we must all plead guilty. That the majority of women would fit into Beveridge's scheme as housewives—not as individuals, but as part of the family unit—is but the most obviously dated of his assumptions and has been subject to deserved attack (Jordan 1991: 18). More overarching is the critique of social insurance's presumption that the middle-class virtues of thrift, prudence, abstemiousness, sobriety, and regular work constitute the code by which all classes must live in order to be social citizens. Janet Beveridge, who had a knack for putting in the baldest terms the ideas that lay more implicit in her husband's writings, encouraged him to set as one of his three main policy objectives 'education of those not yet accustomed to clean careful ways of life' (Harris 1977: 387). This line of attack meshes well with postmodernist critiques of the welfare state, whereby the Beveridge vision is regarded as a relic of Enlightenment notions that there is one standard applicable to all citizens. Quelet's l'homme type and his claim to have charted the predictable fluctuation of averages around the mean to which human diversity can be reduced in an actuarial sense, is declared dissolved in the allegedly multicultural brew of modern societies.

The second line of attack to which Beveridge's emphasis on the contributory principle has left him open is more concrete. The nature of poverty and therefore of participation in the system has turned out to be different from Beveridge's expectations. Much poverty has been increasingly caused by conditions that social insurance cannot cope with. There is a growing group of people who have never been and are unlikely to become regular contributory members of social insurance: the permanently unemployed, single mothers, those bypassed by the educational system, the urban underclass (Jordan 1991: 21). Few of these have hopes of being integrated into a social insurance system intended for the regularly-employed 'normal' working population. The role of means-tested and targeted programmes for the poorest has remained much more important than expected by Beveridge, and has, indeed, grown since the 1970s (Parry 1986: 162). More generally, Beveridge's prognosis that poverty was something that could be cured with the resources at the disposal of social insurance's client pool has not proven correct. Primary poverty has once again become a hurdle for a significant group of society in a way that did not seem likely in the economically heady decades after the War.

The universality of measures that assumed each citizen also to be a contributor has been undermined. With the tattering of this defiant banner of the Beveridgean vision, it has become increasingly clear that the whole notion of universality presupposes a society sufficiently homogeneous for all to be on a similar footing. Positive discrimination, targeting of benefits, increased usage of means tests and similar changes indicate that this is no longer the case. Socially speaking, if the economic disparities between middle and lower classes are too great, the social policy system will not be able to embrace them both, at least not given an ethos of contributory participation, on the same terms. Instead, there will develop social insurance for the better-heeled, and some variant on a new poor law for the worst-off. Culturally speaking, to the extent that society fissiparates into balkanized subgroupings, the question becomes, will each accept membership in the system on the same terms? Will the Algerian schoolgirls in France who refuse to attend class unless veiled be willing to belong to the social insurance system without conditions? Universality may have been an illusion born of the temporary sense of community during the war or one fostered with the greatest success in the uncharacteristically homogeneous societies of northern Europe, but not necessarily one that is practicable, at least not in its postwar formulation, in circumstances of economic decline or in increasingly heterogeneous societies.

**SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP**

This brings us to the ambiguity at the heart of the concept of social citizenship as put into practice by Beveridge and then given its world historical inflection by Marshall: the potential contradiction between being a citizen and being a contributor. If all cannot be contributors, can they be citizens? Civil and political rights are generally accepted as unconditional, with a few obvious exceptions usually involving pyromaniacal loudmouths in crowded public spaces. Social rights, in contrast, are not. Social citizenship, in Marshall's formulation, claims to be an enlargement of earlier and more restricted forms of citizenship. Citizenship in its civil and then political versions is an unmitigated right. Citizens, by virtue only of their membership in the community and regardless of their other virtues or lack
thereof, possess civil rights. Even bounders, cads and hooligans are thus protected. Political rights, above all the vote, are similarly founded. Regardless of merit, education, intelligence, virtue, tax status or most other attributes, all have the right to express their political choice. *Inskriptiert und nicht kneipiert, heißt promoviert* was the way that wags once described the criteria for the doctoral degree at one of the dissertation mills of the nineteenth century, the University of Erlangen. To be immatriculated and not yet dead were the only requisites for the Ph.D. Civil and political rights have a similarly unqualified nature. Social rights, with the exception of the NHS and perhaps the educational system, are less absolute, more contractual in nature. They are coloured by the market and do not completely supplant its criteria for the distribution of resources; they are founded on an extension of the fundamentally exchange-based nature of property rights to welfare benefits.

Moreover, social rights, whatever their nature, were not a simple expansion of their civil and political antecedents. Political rights had indeed been based on and had enhanced civil rights, at least in the sense that the former presupposed the latter. It was unlikely that someone should have political, but not civil rights. One exception was perhaps a German Socialist between 1878 and 1890 who would have been allowed to vote, but not to organize. Social rights, in contrast, are often not an elaboration of these previous levels of rights, but may, in fact, be an alternative to them. It is increasingly characteristic of modern societies that there are many who have social rights and yet no political ones. Turkish 'guest workers' in Berlin, with claims to a pension but no hope of the vote, are perhaps the extreme example. They may, in fact, be bought off, as it were, with more social rights, given a special allowance to return home and effectively abandon any political claims they might have had. The United States is usually criticized as providing examples of the opposite extreme: an impoverished underclass with more civil and political rights than social ones. But even here, there are, for example, immigrants who arrive outside the law with not even the right to residence, but none the less claims to coverage of certain basic expenses: housing, food, and medical care for their native-born children and therefore also for themselves. As under Bismarck, social rights can still serve as substitutes for political and sometimes civil claims. The core to citizenship continues to be founded on political rights. To be a contributor is not the same as being a citizen.

The grand and whiggish teleology of Marshall's vision of citizenship, coming to fruition over several centuries and culminating in the postwar reforms, is a powerful part of the Beveridge mythology that is undercut by an historical look at the actual genesis of social rights. As Gaston Rimlinger, among others, has pointed out, there was no such heroic progression. Like most accurate historical pedigrees, the family tree of social rights was more mongrel than purebred. Social rights were first broached and accepted in the late nineteenth century for a wide variety of motives. In Germany, they were prompted by unabashedly Bonapartist aims, as a substitute for civil and political rights, not as their expansion. In Britain, issues of national efficiency encouraged the property and business classes to support some variety of social rights. Social rights were here welcomed as strengthening, as much as they were feared for encroaching on, property rights (Rimlinger 1983).

The central ambiguity of social rights is the potential contradiction between citizenship and contributorship. The bedrock rights, civil and political, are founded on the sheer fact of citizenship alone, while social rights involve a heavy element of market logic, of contractual ownership. Robert Pinker pointed out some time ago that the legitimacy of benefits founded only on the fact of citizenship was not generally accepted outside the rarefied realm of social reformers and theorists (Pinker 1971: 142). The validity of this insight can be judged most brutally in the effects of the cutbacks that started in the 1970s. In some welfare states, and nowhere more so than in the two nations of American social policy, the poorest are those whose benefits have been most harshly scotched. Theirs are the benefits founded on no contractual legitimacy, the ones given by virtue of need alone, the ones that are therefore most vulnerable to political haggling. The benefits for insurance contributors, in contrast, the ones sanctioned by the market, the ones that the great mass of the middle class thinks it has paid for and will accordingly not relinquish, are those that have proven most resistant to erosion (Goodin and Le Grand 1987; Le Grand and Winter 1986; Hills 1991: 344–7; Pfaller et al. 1991). The more firmly social rights are based on market principles, the more durable they have proven to be.

**BEVERIDGE IN A WORLD VIEW**

Beveridge and his most important interpreters, Marshall and Titmuss, collectively anchored the notion of social citizenship as a major turning point in the evolution of western society. The Beveridgenian reforms, and more generally British social policy development, did not bring this concept to its full fruition, a task probably accomplished by the Swedes sometime in the 1960s. But they may none the less be credited with posing this possibility for the first time as a comprehensive goal and for taking major steps towards it. The idea of social citizenship has been attacked for being parochially derived from British developments alone (Mann 1987; Turner 1990). Much of such reproach is certainly well merited. But much of it also builds on claims that the Anglo-Saxon route to modern forms of political
Baldwin

community differed significantly from others, especially the German—claims that are part of an outdated reading of European history that relies on overly static notions of bourgeois revolution and a German Sonderweg. Such criticism also ignores the extent to which social citizenship was a goal expressly adopted by other nations as their own in the postwar period. No one has been more assiduous in claiming social citizenship as theirs than the Swedes, even to the point of denying Beveridge any influence whatsoever. Moreover, whenever European students of social policy, with the exception perhaps of the Swiss, bother to compare their systems to others, whatever differences separate the European arrangements from each other quickly tend to fade in juxtaposition to what they share in common and in contrast to the rest of the globe. Beveridge and Marshall, in other words, managed to formulate something that has had an importance far beyond Britain.

None the less, it is true that the whole concept of social policy associated with their endeavours has in recent years eroded in terms of its ability to supply an understanding of the welfare state as a phenomenon found increasingly throughout the entire world. How should we evaluate the social citizenship welfare state in the light of these newest global developments in social policy? Until recently, much literature on the welfare state took the social citizenship model as the endpoint of social policy development. Sweden under Social Democratic reign was the welfare Meca that all other nations were either striving towards or abjuring. The road to the welfare state was seen as a simple two-way street with movement possible only towards or away from the social citizenship model. One of the many peculiarities of this view was that it subjected developments in that increasingly dominant part of the world, that may rightly be considered as consisting of welfare states in one incarnation or another, to the intellectual hegemony of the historical evolution of one unusual and idiosyncratic corner of the globe: Sweden, somewhat more broadly phrased, Scandinavia; or, in the widest formulations, western Continental Europe north of the butter/oil line. The question is why, once we look away from the normative assumptions that often colour the hopes held by many students of social policy for the welfare state, developments that are localized to so comparatively limited an area should set the standard for all other places.

Gerhard Ritter, in a major reinterpretation of the global history of the welfare state, has tried to make Germany, rather than the Anglo-Swedish, Beveridge-Möller-Myrdal approach, the historically appropriate benchmark for the evolution of the welfare state (Ritter 1991). More provocatively, Richard Rose has recently argued that, measured in terms of geopolitical clout, what he calls the American-Pacific model of the welfare state should be the dominant prism through which to observe social policy development (Rose 1991). The American-Pacific model, for whatever worth so sweeping a typology can have, includes the major Pacific rim nations and involves a welfare state where the state plays a much less pronounced role than in the social citizenship model, one in which much social provision is given over to private, family, and business interests for administration and execution. Similar attempts to identify qualitatively different kinds of welfare states, not just different approximations to the ideal type of the social citizenship model, can be found in much recent literature on the welfare state (Baldwin 1992).

To the extent that this sea change in approaches to the welfare state holds, it obviously has implications for the social citizenship model and for any attempt to evaluate Beveridge's place in history. If the welfare state based on social citizenship is but one, and not even necessarily the most important, variety of welfare states, then the grand teleology inherent in Marshall's vision must come apart. The tension and ambiguity in the concepts of social citizenship and social rights are thus brought to the foreground. The beneficiary by virtue of citizenship and the beneficiary by contributory effort are more sharply distinguished in the privatized models of the welfare state than in the social citizenship model. Certain benefits that in some systems are social rights provided by the state are, in others, social rights bought on the market. The accent in these latter systems has shifted away from the citizen to the contributor. As these privatized systems come to dominate our view of the welfare state, the romance of the social citizenship model will be over.

FROM ONE NEW WORLD ORDER TO ANOTHER

Must Beveridge's ship rise and fall with the tides of the social citizenship welfare state? To the extent that he is one of its founders, clearly it must. The crucial emphasis on universality is one of the tenets of the social citizenship faith that we owe to him—one which we must, alas, watch honoured increasingly in the breach. But there is, at the same time, the individualistic, the liberal bent to Beveridge's thought. Viewed from the perspective of the social citizenship model, these aspects of his philosophy have been attacked most stridently. It was, so the usual claim runs, Beveridge's emphasis on voluntary action, on limiting the state's role, on encouraging individuals to provide for themselves beyond the state's purview, thus creating a gulf between those with and those without, that hobbled British social policy compared to those nations in which the state was made responsible for all aspects of provision. However, if Beveridge's philosophy is to maintain its force in the era when the social citizenship welfare state becomes marginalized, then it is precisely these vilified aspects of his thought that will be sought out. It is the anti-statist parts of his thought, if any, that harmonize with the American-Pacific model of social
policy, or whatever (if any) designation eventually sticks to describe all those welfare states that are not like Sweden in the 1960s and unlikely to become so. It is these aspects of his philosophy, if any, that are likely to appeal to reformers in Eastern Europe who face the peculiar predicament of grappling with the legacy of decades, if not centuries, of an all-assuring state, and who, at the same time and precisely for this reason, are fuelled by desires to cut back the statist undergrowth in hopes of letting civil society luxuriate.

Sometime during the First World War, Beatrice Webb remarked rather sourly that it was 'a queer result of this strange and horrible war', that Beveridge of all people should have 'risen suddenly into the limelight as an accepted designer of the New World Order' (Harris 1977: 426). Were any contemporary reformers now to take inspiration from his philosophy, it would be hard to say why Beveridge was any more peculiar a formulator than those who claim to be designing the new world order of our own age.

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